Texian Press Release #4
In our course and benevolence to exist, many questions arise and should be answered respectively: Is the republic of Texas a legal, lawful and serious entity? Under what state or condition does it presently exist? What is the historical explanation for this condition that will help pave the road to relief and remedy?
Evidence of the republic’s legitimacy is most compelling through the intimidating Valentine’s Day, 2015, assault and battery inflicted upon Texians during their monthly peaceful and open-to-the-public congressional session by at least nine different law enforcement agencies (federal, state, county, municipal) of the occupying corporate power; that description will be addressed subsequently.
Furthermore, the Valentine’s Day raid was the response actuated by the fraudulent service of a bogus Class A Misdemeanor warrant in Bryan, Texas of Brazos County from the Kerr County (some 200 miles to the west) administrative judge of the corporate 216th district in apparent retribution or retaliation regarding service to the sister 198th district judge of Writs of Mandamus and Quo Warranto by a Common Law Court associated with the republic of Texas.
Finally, evidence is unmistakable by the corporate-controlled media assaulting the republic of Texas with intentionally slurring, marginalizing, neutralizing and defaming propaganda in reporting untruths about the republic of Texas officials allegedly being of a violent “militia” tainted nature.
We Texians feel we must first confront the stigma brandished by a biased presentation the media has painted in the past. This libel is expected and seen as one of many symptoms of attack attempting to diminish the credibility of and to disrupt or disband the republic of Texas government of a true and legitimate nation.
Freedom of the press and speech are founded rights and are inclusive as well in the republic of Texas. Good journalism is to be unbiased in that it is to give both sides of the story for the public’s benefit rather than be a tool to create a herd mentality: After the stampede, legitimate pursuit of truth proves they hanged the wrong man!
Let us be clear and direct: no society is perfect. There was only one perfect and He being crucified for all the world’s redemption. If this statement rankles some and invokes offense according to the free speech-violating tenets of political incorrectness, we Texians profess guilt and proudly affirm our faith.
Now, in our previous published press release, we presented publications from international law that raised questions. Texians believe in a well-informed people, for they make a well-informed jury. “If a nation expects to be ignorant and free, in a state of civilization, it expects what never was and never will be.” Thomas Jefferson, 1816.
In a state of duress and the threat of censorship, we present now another publication and hope we can continue, without further intrusion, to inform and complete our case to you, the people. Thereby, our prayer is you, the reader, will be given patience in pursuit of truth and we Texians granted time (Lord willing) to effect a greater understanding of the people regarding the republic of Texas.
[Use of Force – War and Neutrality Peace Treaties, Rudolf Bernhard, 2014, (Military Government pg.270……..)]. Prerequisite upon a people being an occupant, the state may choose to exercise its occupying power over government functions not necessarily through an army but by alternative preference through civilian administrators in occupied territory. International law only looks at the occupant as such and imposes restrictions on him irrespective of whether he acts under a military or civilian government within the occupied territory. Therefore, under international law, a distinction must be made regarding those entrusted with the government functions of the occupying power:
[a] the military units and their commanders in the occupying power
[b] the occupying power as such
[c] the persons, whether military or civilian
According to the conditions prevailing in each case, the military commander may also be the military governor; another possibility is that the occupied territories may be governed by a civilian administration. By international law, both military and civilian governments derive their rights and duties from the occupying power.
We in the republic of Texas are most adamant regarding the eradication of slavery, including involuntary servitude. Corruption of blood is also outlawed: One generation will not be charged or held accountable for the actions of another. Everyone is responsible for his or her own actions. With that in mind, any reference to the war of aggression known as the Civil War is to educate in not only the wrongs that brought about the conflict but also those that continue today to chain each one to servitude.
In the book, War Powers under the Constitution of the United States by William Whiting, 1864, we quote; “whatever may be the extent or limitation of the power conveyed, it is admitted by all that it contains the power of imposing taxes to an unlimited amount and the right to appropriate the money so obtained to the common defense and public welfare.” He goes on to say, “A handful of slave-masters have broken up that union, have overthrown justice, and have destroyed domestic tranquility.” [We agree a handful of slave-masters broke up the union and created new slave masters exchanging one for another.] He goes on to say “instead of contributing…., they have attempted to establish, over the ruins of the republic, an aristocratic government founded upon slavery.” We believe they’ve succeeded!
The essential contiguity between the “state of exception” and sovereignty was established by Carl Schmitt in his book Politische Theologie (1922). Although his famous definition of the sovereign as “he who decides on the ‘state of exception'” has been widely commented on and discussed, there is still no theory of the “state of exception” in public law, and jurists and theorists of public law seem to regard the problem more as a quaestio facti than as a genuine juridical problem. Not only is such a theory deemed illegitimate by those authors who (following the ancient maxim according to which necessitas legem non habet [necessity has no law]) affirm that the “state of necessity” on which the exception is founded cannot have a juridical form, but it is difficult even to arrive at a definition of the term given its position at the interface between politics and law. Indeed, according to a widely held opinion, the “state of exception” constitutes a “point of imbalance between public law and political fact” (Saint-Bonnet, 2001) that is situated—like civil war, insurrection and resistance—in an “ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the political” (Fontana, 1999). The question of borders between legal and political becomes all the more urgent: if exceptional measures are the result of periods of political crisis and, as such, must be understood on political and not juridico-constitutional grounds (De Martino, 1973), then they find themselves in the paradoxical position of being juridical measures that cannot be understood in legal terms, and the “state of exception” appears as the legal form of what cannot have legal form. On the other hand, if the law employs the exception—that is the “suspension of law” itself—as its original means of referring to and encompassing life, then a theory of the “state of exception” is the preliminary condition for any definition of the relation that binds the living being to the law but also divorces him from the protection of the law.
It is this no-man’s-land between public law and political fact, and between the juridical order and life that the present study seeks to investigate. Only if the veil covering this ambiguous zone is lifted will we be able to approach an understanding of the stakes involved in the difference—or the supposed difference—between the political and the juridical, and between law and the living being. And, perhaps only then will it be possible to answer the question that never ceases to reverberate in the history of Western politics: What does it mean to act politically?
One of the elements that makes the “state of exception” so difficult to define is certainly its close relationship to civil war, insurrection, and resistance. Because civil war is the opposite of normal conditions, it lies in a zone of undecidability with respect to the “state of exception,” which is state power’s immediate response to the most extreme internal conflicts. Thus, over the course of the twentieth century, we have been able to witness a paradoxical phenomenon that has been effectively defined as a “legal civil war” (Schnur, 1983). Let us take the case of the Nazi State, by example. No sooner did Hitler take power (or, as we should perhaps more accurately say, no sooner was power given to him) than, on February 28, he proclaimed the Decree for the Protection of the People and the State, which suspended the articles of the Weimar Constitution concerning personal liberties. The decree was never repealed, so that from a juridical standpoint, the entire Third Reich can be considered a “state of exception” that lasted twelve years. In this sense, modern totalitarianism can be defined as the establishment, by means of the “state of exception,” of a legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who, for some reason, cannot be integrated into the political system. Since then, the voluntary creation of a permanent “state of emergency” (though perhaps not declared in the technical sense) has become one of the essential practices of contemporary states, including so-called democratic republics.
Faced with the unstoppable progression of what has been called a “global civil war,” the “state of exception” tends increasingly to appear as the dominant paradigm of government in contemporary politics. This transformation of a provisional and exceptional measure into a technique of government threatens radically to alter– in fact, has already palpably altered– the structure and meaning of the traditional distinction between constitutional forms. Indeed, from this perspective, the “state of exception” appears as a threshold of indeterminacy between Democracy and absolutism. The uncertainty of the concept is exactly matched by terminological uncertainty. The present study will use the syntagma “state of exception” as the technical term for the consistent set of legal phenomena that it seeks to define. This term, which is common in German theory (Ausnahmezustand, but also Notstand, “state of necessity”), is foreign to Italian and French theory, which prefers to speak of emergency decrees and “state of siege” (political or fictitious, état de siège fictif ). In Anglo-Saxon theory, the terms martial law and emergency powers prevail.
If, as has been suggested, terminology is the properly poetic moment of thought, then terminological choices can never be neutral. In this sense, the choice of the term “state of exception” implies a position taken on both the nature of the phenomenon that we seek to investigate and the logic most suitable for understanding it. Though the notions of “state of siege” and martial law express a connection with the “state of war” that has been historically decisive and is present to this day, they nevertheless prove to be inadequate to define the proper structure of the phenomenon; they must therefore be qualified as political or fictitious terms that are themselves misleading in some ways. The “state of exception” is not a special kind of law (like the law of war); rather, insofar as it is a “suspension of the juridical order” itself, it defines law’s threshold or limit concept.
The history of the term fictitious or political “state of siege” is instructive in this regard. It goes back to the French doctrine that—in reference to Napoleon’s decree of December 24, 1811—provided for the possibility of a “state of siege” that the emperor could declare whether or not a city was actually under attack or directly threatened by enemy forces: “whenever circumstances require giving more forces and more power to the military police, without it being necessary to put the place in a ‘state of siege'” (Reinach 1885). The institution of the “state of siege” has its origin in the French Constituent Assembly’s decree of July 8, 1791 which distinguished among état de paix, in which military authority and civil authority each acts in its own sphere; état de guerre, in which civil authority must act in concert with military authority; and état de siège in which “all the functions entrusted to the civil authority for maintaining order and internal policing pass to the military commander, who exercises them under his exclusive responsibility.” The decree referred only to military strongholds and ports, but with the law of 19 Fructidor Year 5, the Directory assimilated municipalities in the interior with the strongholds and, with the law of 18 Fructidor of the same year, granted itself the right to put a city in a “state of siege.” The subsequent history of the “state of siege” is the history of its gradual emancipation from the wartime situation to which it was originally bound in order to be used as an extraordinary police measure to cope with internal sedition and disorder, thus changing from a real or military “state of siege” to a fictitious or political one. In any case, it is important not to forget that the modern “state of exception” is a creation of the democratic-revolutionary tradition and not the absolutist one.
The idea of a suspension of the constitution was introduced for the first time in the Constitution of 22 Frimaire Year 8, Article 92 of which reads, “In the case of armed revolt or disturbances that would threaten the security of the State, the law can, in the places and for the time that it determines, suspend the rule of the constitution. In such cases, this suspension can be provisionally declared by a decree of the government if the legislative body is in recess, provided that this body be convened as soon as possible by an article of the same decree.” The city or region in question was declared hors la constitution. Although the paradigm is on the one hand (in the “state of siege”) the extension of the military authority’s wartime powers into the civil sphere and, on the other, a suspension of the constitution (or of those constitutional norms that protect individual liberties), in time the two models end up merging into a single juridical phenomenon that we call the “state of exception.”
The expression “full powers” (pleins pouvoirs), which is sometimes used to characterize the “state of exception,” refers to the “expansion of the powers of the government,” and in particular the “conferral on the executive of the power to issue decrees having the force of law.” It derives from the notion of plenitudo potestatis, which was elaborated in that true and proper laboratory of modern public legal terminology that was canon law. The presupposition here is that the “state of exception” entails a return to an original, pleromatic state in which the distinction among the different powers (legislative, executive, etc.) has not yet been produced. As we will see, the “state of exception” constitutes rather a kenomatic state, an emptiness of law, and the idea of an originary indistinction and fullness of power must be considered a legal mythologeme analogous to the idea of a “state of nature” (and it is not by chance that it was precisely Schmitt who had recourse to this mythologeme). In any case, the term “full power” describes one of the executive power’s possible modes of action during the “state of exception,” but it does not coincide with it.
Between 1934 and 1948, in the face of the collapse of Europe’s democracies, the theory of the “state of exception” (which had made a first, isolated appearance in 1921 with Schmitt’s book Dictatorship) saw a moment of particular fortune, but it is significant that this occurred in the pseudomorphic form of a debate over so-called constitutional dictatorship.
This term (which German jurists had already used to indicate the emergency [eccezionali] powers that Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution granted the president of the Reich [Hugo Preuss: Reichsverfassungs- mäßige Diktatur]) was taken up again and developed by Frederick M. Watkins (The Problem of Constitutional Dictatorship, 1940), Carl J. Friedrich (Constitutional Government and Democracy, 1941), and finally Clinton L. Rossiter (Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in the Modern Democracies, 1948). Before them, we must also at least mention the book by the Swedish jurist Herbert Tingsten, Les pleins pouvoirs. L’expansion des pouvoirs gouvernementaux pendant et après la Grande Guerre (1934).
Mainstream media has continually tried to marginalized the republic of Texas as misinformed old men, amusing paper filers, out of touch, etc…. then we ask to be informed. Please explain why for more than 80 years [we believe much longer] as shown in the 1974 US Senate report on Emergency War Powers, no US Congress has corrected the Emergency status in which the Constitution and real Laws are ignored? Is this because of a continual failure in policymaking or can it be the aristocracy’s illicit plundering of the subjects’ subsistence through servitude and for maniacal empire building? “The union must be saved at all cost …” — even through the ethnic cleansing of all Texians? Who will be next — Christians?
Where is the investigative journalist who will Follow the Money? Even Dorothy from the Wizard of Oz knew she had to follow the yellow brick road [money] to get to the Wizard! Was it not little Toto who looked behind the veil of fear and disinformation to expose the great and powerful Oz? Who has profited from this fictionally orchestrated continuous emergency powers “state of exception?” Who has suffered most? Who indeed holds the real power? The plundering deceiving few or the multitude of good, hardworking people? Seek ye the truth and the truth shall set you free!
John Harold Jarnecke
President of the republic of Texas
March 13, 2015
Contact: www.thetexasrepublic.com for the Secretary of State